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OFFSHORE DRILLING: COMBATING
REGULATORY UNCERTAINTY WITH
CONTRACT LAW PROTECTION
ABSTRACT
Offshore drilling accounts for billions of dollars in tax revenue every
year. It is a pillar of the energy industry and is crucial to the economy. A
recent flurry of deregulation, accelerating with the arrival of the Trump
administration, highlights the tremendous impact politics has upon the
profitability of this sector. The Secretary of the Interior, under the direction
of the President, wields the power to regulate and make determinations into
where, when, and how private companies can drill offshore. These private
companies have contracts with the government for the opportunity to
produce and develop oil or gas on the outer continental shelf. The Note will
examine whether a new act or regulation may constitute a breach of
contract if the act or regulation makes production unduly burdensome and
thus not feasible for a drilling venture. If production becomes unduly
burdensome due to government intervention, then the contract may be
breached. This could cause the company to lose billions of dollars in
upfront costs and significant opportunity costs, and so private companies
need protection from this contentious political battle over the United States’
offshore resources. The suggested framework for this protection looks to a
developing common law doctrine of offshore lease breaches and seeks to
reconcile those opinions. Adopting this framework will allow parties to plan
ex ante for future administration shifts and allow courts to more efficiently
and predictably resolve disputes arising from newly passed legislation.
INTRODUCTION
In the first few months of his presidency, President Trump implemented
an “America First” policy designed to promote the capture of offshore oil
and gas resources in the United States.1 President Trump put forward this
strategy “in order to maintain the Nation’s position as a global energy
leader and foster energy security and resilience for the benefit of the
American people.” 2 The policy directs, inter alia, that the Secretary of the
Interior: (1) revise the schedule of annual leases 3 to the maximum extent
provided by law in certain offshore planning areas, (2) refrain from
designating any new conservation sanctuaries, (3) revoke Executive Order
1. See Exec. Order No. 13,795, 82 Fed. Reg. 20815 (Apr. 28, 2017).
2. Id.
3. The Government annually reviews and issues leases of offshore lands; companies acquire

these leases granting them the rights to rights to explore and develop oil. See Oil & Gas Leasing
on
the
Outer
Continental
Shelf,
BUREAU
OF
OCEAN
ENERGY
MGMT,
https://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/Oil_and_Gas_Energy_Program/Leasing/5BOEMRE
_Leasing101.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2019).
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13,754 of December 19, 2016 (Northern Bering Sea Climate Resilience), 4
(4) reconsider the Well Control Rule, 5 and (5) reconsider and rescind other
prohibitive regulations, memoranda, and notices. 6 Furthermore, the
“America First” policy removes regulations and safeguards put in place by
previous administrations in furtherance of increasing energy production on
federal lands and reducing reliance on imported energy. 7
In the wake of Trump’s inauguration, the Republican-controlled
Congress adopted a similar spirit of deregulation. In December 2017,
Congress approved a bill opening up oil and gas exploration in the 1.5million-acre coastal plain of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR). 8
Congress passed the measure as part of its tax-reform package that
President Trump signed into law on December 19, 2017. 9 This ended the
thirty-seven-year ban on drilling in ANWR. This is significant because
environmentalists consider ANWR one of the most pristine areas in the
United States, as it is home to many exotic species and indigenous people.10
Proponents of drilling in ANWR argue that drilling could create up to
130,000 jobs and up to $440 billion in government revenue. 11 Opening up
ANWR to drilling remains highly controversial.
This is a dramatic shift from the Obama administration’s energy policy
that addressed climate change and focused on renewable energy. 12 The
Trump administration has made a considerable effort to dismantle these
energy regulations, and not just within the realm of offshore drilling. For
example, on March 28, 2017, an Executive Order directed the
4. This Executive Order was signed by President Obama shortly before the Trump
administration entered into power. The order created a “resilience area” stretching over 112,300
square miles. Furthermore, it withdrew 40,300 square miles in the of the Norton Basin from
petroleum leasing. For more information, see Obama Creates ‘Resilience Area’ to Protect
Alaska’s
Bering
Ecosystem,
CHI.
TRIBUNE
(Dec.
9,
2016,
9:56
PM),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-alaska-bering-sea-protections-obama20161209-story.html.
5. The Well Control Rule was enacted in 2016 and “updated requirements for equipment and
operations for well control activities associated with drilling, completion, workover and
decommissioning operations.” See Well Control Rule, BUREAU OF SAFETY & ENVTL. ENF’T,
https://www.bsee.gov/guidance-and-regulations/regulations/well-control-rule.
6. Exec. Order No. 13,795, 82 Fed. Reg. 20815 (Apr. 28, 2017).
7. See id.
8. Michael Collins, Congress Moves to ‘Drill, Baby, Drill’ in Alaska’s ANWR. Here’s What
You Should Know, USA TODAY (Nov. 19, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story
/news/politics/2017/11/19/congress-moves-drill-baby-drill-alaska-anwr-refuge-heres-what-youshould-know/874187001.
9. See id.; see also Thomas Kaplan & Alan Rappeport, Republican Tax Bill Passes Senate in
51-48 Vote, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/19/us/politics/taxbill-vote-congress.html.
10. Collins, supra note 8.
11. Id.
12. See Jeff Brady, ’America First’ Energy Plan Challenges Free Market Realities, NPR (Feb.
7, 2017, 4:01 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/02/07/513905161/trumps-energy-shift-could-bringhigher-gas-prices-analysts-say.
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Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to dismantle the Clean Power Plan
(CPP). 13 The CPP would have required states to substantially cut carbon
dioxide emissions from existing power plants. 14 Another example is
President Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement. 15 This
agreement that would have led the United States to cut greenhouse gas
emissions by as much as 28% from 2005 levels by 2025. 16 The purpose of
these deregulations is to remove burdens on the energy industry to drive
growth within the sector. 17
Offshore drilling constitutes a massive sector of the energy industry
and, as such, it is important that there is stability. 18 As energy companies
react in response to the deregulation created by the Trump administration,
uncertainty arises as to the profitability and risks of offshore drilling. 19 This
uncertainty derives from the unknown actions that future administrations
may take. While the Trump administration has ushered in a period of
deregulation, what will the results be if past protections are reenacted? This
is especially true regarding ANWR, as the region has been a hotbed of
political contention for decades. 20 The core question which this Note
explores is: when will government regulations interfere with company
operations so substantially as to constitute a breach of the agreement
between the government and energy companies? 21
13. Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 28, 2017).
14. See Israel Katz, The Legal Climate on Climate Change: The Fate of the EPA’s Clean

Power Plan After Michigan and UARG, 11 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 495, 495–96 (2017).
15. See Valerie Volcovici, U.S. Submits Formal Notice of Withdrawal from Paris Climate
Pact, REUTERS, Aug. 4, 2017, 5:25 PM, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-climate-usaparis/u-s-submits-formal-notice-of-withdrawal-from-paris-climate-pact-idUSKBN1AK2FM.
16. See id.
17. See Brady, supra note 12.
18. In 2016, 766,103 barrels of oil and 1,256,539,956 MCF of gas (an abbreviation denoting a
thousand cubic feet of natural gas) were drilled from the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS); this
production generated approximately $28 billion dollars based on the ratio of total revenue of the
oil and gas industry for that year. See MCF - Thousand Cubic Feet, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/mcf.asp (last visited Feb. 2, 2019) (providing an
explanation of MCF); Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Production, BUREAU OF SAFETY &
ENVTL. ENF’T, https://www.data.bsee.gov/Production/OCSProduction/Default.aspx (last visited
Feb. 2, 2019) (showing statistical data on the annual oil and gas production on the outer
continental shelf); U.S. gas and oil industry annual revenue 2010-2017, STATISTA,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/294614/revenue-of-the-gas-and-oil-industry-in-the-us/
(last
updated Dec. 8, 2017) (showing a graph of oil and gas industry revenue in the United States from
2010 to 2017).
19. Companies lease land on the OCS (land which is in held in public trust) from the
government to drill for oil and gas. See also Daniel Gross, Businesses Are Finally Realizing That
Trump
Causes
“Uncertainty”, SLATE
MAG.
(Aug.
8,
2017,
5:10
PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2017/08/businesses_are_finally_realizing_that_
trump_causes_uncertainty.html.
20. Collins, supra note 8.
21. As will be discussed throughout this Note, companies purchase leases from the
Government in order to drill for oil and gas. These leases are subject to their provisions and a wide
array of regulations. 16 U.S.C. § 1431 (1988).
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The answer lies in contract law. Fundamentally, there is a relationship
between the companies and the government, and at the heart of this
relationship is a contract: 22 a bargained for exchange of mutual promises. 23
It is a basic tenant of contract law that a contract imposes a duty to perform
on the promise. 24 According to the U.S. Supreme Court in the salient
Winstar case, “[w]hen the United States enters into contract[ual] relations,
its rights and duties therein are governed generally by the law applicable to
contracts between private individuals.” 25 The government cannot escape its
obligations as a contractor. 26 Shifting administrations cannot impose
regulations which materially breach contracts entered into by previous
administrations. 27 This principle is especially important because, although
the leases are typically for a five-year period, the leases have a provision
which extends them “for as long as oil and/or natural gas is produced in
paying quantities or approved drilling operations are conducted.” 28 It is the
natural role for contract law to provide stability in the murky waters of
offshore drilling.
Part I of this Note explains the general regulatory framework
concerning offshore drilling and the process which a company must
complete before drilling for oil or gas. Part II analyzes how the courts have
ruled when companies allege that new acts or regulations have breached
their lease agreements. Part II then analyzes the Century Exploration New
Orleans, LLC v. United States 29 ruling following the events of the
Deepwater Horizon disaster and how the ruling of the U.S. Court of Federal
Claims in that case may be problematic. Part III suggests a framework for
determining whether there is a breach of contract and discusses what
remedies are likely to result after a breach has occurred.
I. BACKGROUND ON LEASING ACTIVITIES PRIOR TO
DRILLING OFFSHORE
In order to understand litigation arising from breaches of offshore
leases, it is first necessary to understand the process an entity must endure
to obtain a lease. Courts have opined that “the regulatory procedures and
standards to which an Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) lease is subject stand
as the ‘gateway’ through which a lessee must pass in order to exercise its

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

See Mobil Oil Expl. & Producing S.E., Inc. v. United States, 530 U.S. 604, 607 (2000).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, ch. 1, §§ 1, 3 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
Id. at § 2.
United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 895 (1996).
The government essentially waived its privilege of sovereign immunity when it entered
into the contract; the government is bound as though it were a private individual. See Winstar, 518
U.S. at 895.
27. Id.
28. Oil & Gas Leasing on the Outer Continental Shelf, supra note 3.
29. See Century Expl. New Orleans, LLC v. United States, 110 Fed. Cl. 148, 157 (2013).
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contractual right to the oil and gas contained within its lease.” 30 The
government holds offshore land in jus publicum and only allows a private
company the opportunity to drill for oil and gas resources should it meet the
government’s rigorous standards. If this gateway is substantially narrowed
through modification of the lease standards and procedures, then the lease
will be materially breached. 31
The Department of the Interior (DOI) governs the extraction of oil and
gas from federal lands. 32 Offshore drilling takes place on the OCS. The
OCS is all of the submerged land under federal control, which are all lands
between three nautical miles and 200 nautical miles from the shore. 33 This
land was claimed in 1945, when President Truman formally declared that
“the Government of the United States regards the natural resources of the
subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas but
contiguous to the coasts of the United States as appertaining to the United
States, subject to its jurisdiction and control.” 34 Shortly thereafter, Congress
enacted the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA or the Act) in
1953. 35 Although it has since been amended, its principal purpose remains
to “expedite exploration and development of the [OCS] in order to achieve
national economic and energy policy goals, assure national security, reduce
dependence on foreign sources, and maintain a favorable balance of
payments in world trade.” 36
In the United States, oil and gas resources are privately owned as
opposed to other countries where these resources are nationalized and
owned solely by the government, despite the OCS being held in jus
publicum. 37 The United States merely leases the land held in public trust to
private entities. 38 Leasing activities are perpetuated by the OCSLA, with
responsibility ultimately falling upon the Secretary of the Interior (the
Secretary) who is responsible for the development and mineral exploration
of the OCS. 39 The Act gives the Secretary the power to lease the OCS, and
to “prescribe the rules and regulations as may be necessary” to carry out the
OCSLA. 40 Accordingly, the DOI created agencies to carry out this mandate.
In 1983, the Secretary created the Minerals Management Service (MMS) as
the agency responsible for the leasing of OCS lands and for the supervision
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Mobil Oil Expl. & Producing S.E., Inc. v. United States, 530 U.S. 604, 621 (2000).
Amber Res. Co. v. United States (Amber Resources I), 68 Fed. Cl. 535, 546 (2005).
See id.
43 U.S.C. §§ 1301, 1331 (1986).
Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (Oct. 2, 1945).
See
OCS
Lands
Act
History, BUREAU OF OCEAN
ENERGY MGMT,
https://www.boem.gov/ocs-lands-act-history/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2019).
36. 43 U.S.C. § 1802(1) (1978).
37. See Michael P. Joy & Sashe D. Dimitroff, Oil and Gas Regulation in the United States:
Overview, WESTLAW UK (June 1, 2016), available at https://1.next.westlaw.com/9-525-1545.
38. See id.
39. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1978).
40. See id.
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of operations after lease issuance. 41 In 2010, MMS was renamed the Bureau
of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE);
then, later in 2011, BOEMRE was divided into the present day Bureau of
Ocean Energy Management (BOEM or the Agency) and the Bureau of
Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE). 42
The lease agreements contain provisions that restrict how oil and gas
companies may use the leased lands. 43 Furthermore, the dozens of
government agencies which regulate offshore drilling activities have
authority to do so under the provisions bargained for in the leasing
agreements. 44 These leases “entitle the lessee to explore, develop, and
produce the oil and gas contained within the lease area, conditioned upon
due diligence requirements and the approval of the development and
production plan required by [the OCSLA].” 45 It is important to note that the
government may cancel any lease or permit if, after a hearing, “continued
activity pursuant to such lease or permit would probably cause serious harm
or damage to life (including fish and other aquatic life), to property, to any
mineral (in areas leased or not leased), to the national security or defense, or
to the marine, coastal, or human environment.” 46 Although the exercise of
this power would be extremely unorthodox, it is specifically provided for
by statute. 47
The issuance of these contracts is a multistage process and it may take
years before production begins. 48 Congress created four stages to the
development of an offshore oil or gas well: (1) the Secretary develops fiveyear lease plan based on the nation’s energy needs, (2) leases are sold to
bidders at a competitive auction, (3) the lessees conduct exploration
activities, and (4) the lessees engage in development and production
activities. 49
A. THE LEASE PLAN
In the life of an offshore well, the DOI must first prepare “a schedule of
proposed lease sales indicating, as precisely as possible, the size, timing,
and location of leasing activity which [the Secretary] determines will best
meet national energy needs for the five-year period following its
approval.” 50 In developing these plans, the Secretary is required to consider
41. See OCS Lands Act History, supra note 35.
42. See id.
43. See Form BOEM-2005, § 1 (Feb. 2017), BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT, available at

https://www.boem.gov/BOEM-2005/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2019).
44. See id.
45. 43 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(4) (1978).
46. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a)(2)(A)(i).
47. See Amber Res. Co. v. United States (Amber Resources II), 73 Fed. Cl. 738 (2006).
48. See Sec’y of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312, 337 (1984).
49. Id.
50. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a).
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“relevant environmental and predictive information for different areas of
the [OCS].” 51 Finally, the Secretary must assure that the government
receive “fair market value” for the lease, and “select the timing and location
of leasing, to the maximum extent practicable, so as to obtain a proper
balance between the potential for environmental damage, the potential for
the discovery of oil and gas, and the potential for adverse impact on the
coastal zone.” 52 At this stage, environmental concerns and the need for
energy production are balanced in accordance with the policies of the
controlling administration. 53
B. LEASE SALES
Pursuant to the Secretary’s five-year plan, the leases are sold at a
“competitive, sealed-bid auction.” 54 The purchasers of these leases only
gain the right to conduct “preliminary activities.” 55 The activities consist of
“OCS-geophysical and other surveys that do not involve seabed
penetrations greater than 300 feet and that do not result in any significant
environmental impacts.” 56 The lessees do not acquire the right to do more
after winning the bid; they only acquire the right to submit plans for
exploration, development, and production. 57 The “preliminary activities”
are to test the OCS, and, if suitable, to develop an Exploration Plan (EP).
All preliminary activities must be approved by BOEM. 58 Finally, it is
important to note that “the contract, in practice, amount[s] primarily to an
opportunity to try to obtain exploration and development rights in
accordance with the procedures and under the standards specified in the
cross-referenced statutes and regulations.” 59 Considering the high price of
the bid, the speculative nature of the leased area, and the limited rights
available to the purchaser, drilling offshore is prohibitively expensive for
those without the deep pockets necessary to engage in this venture. 60

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(2).
Id. at § 1344(a)(3)–(4).
See id.
See Century Expl. New Orleans, LLC v. United States, 110 Fed. Cl. 148, 154 (2013).
See Sec’y of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312, 337 (1984).
Id. at 338–39.
See id. at 339.
See N. Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 594 (D.C. Cir. 1980); See also 30 C.F.R. §
551.2 (2013).
59. Mobil Oil Expl. and Producing S.E., Inc. v. U.S., 530 U.S. 604, 620 (2000) (emphasis in
original).
60. See How Do Average Costs Compare Among Various Oil Drillings Rigs?, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/061115/how-do-average-costs-compare-differenttypes-oil-drilling-rigs.asp (last visited Feb. 15, 2019).
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C. EXPLORATION PLAN
The third step is for the lessee to submit an EP to DOI. 61 The EP must
be consistent with the coastal management plan of any affected state under
the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA), 62 along with any other
regulation required by the DOI. 63 DOI then reviews the EP and should the
plan purport to cause any “serious harm or damage to life (including fish
and other aquatic life), to property, to any mineral (in areas leased or not
leased), to the national security or defense, or to the marine, coastal, or
human environment];” if the harm cannot be avoided, then the plan cannot
be approved. 64 If the EP is not approved, then the government must pay the
lessee “either the fair value of its lease or the lessee’s costs from the day its
lease was acquired, whichever is less.” 65
Following approval and permission of the EP, the applicant can begin
exploratory drilling of the OCS. 66 Exploratory drilling will typically consist
of drilling several temporary wells. 67 A positive find leads to several more
wells to verify the quality of the well before moving onto the next stage. 68
Exploration is essential when prospecting new areas to drill. 69 Exploratory
drilling is used to confirm or deny the data gathered during preliminary
activities. 70 An exploration well additionally allows for more effective
drilling during the development stage. However, drilling several temporary
wells is an expensive endeavor, and the lessee must invest significant
capital in order to do so. 71
D. PRODUCTION & DEVELOPMENT
The last stage involves developing and producing the oil or natural
gas. In this stage, the lessee must submit a Development and Production
Plan (DPP). The lessee submits a DPP after it has uncovered a sufficient
72

61. See Century Expl. New Orleans, LLC v. United States, 110 Fed. Cl. 148, 155 (2013).
62. The CZMA gives “coastal states a voice in the regulatory approval of OCS lease activity

occurring off of their coast.” In doing so, coastal states can develop their own coastal management
program (CMP) which must be federally approved. See Amber Res. Co. v. United States (Amber
Resources I), 68 Fed. Cl. 535, 539 (2005).
63. For example, BOEM may issue notices which allow them to change the requirements of
the lessees. See Century Expl. New Orleans, LLC v. United States, 110 Fed. Cl. 148, 152 (2013).
64. See 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a)(2)(A)(i) (2005); see also 43 U.S.C. § 1340(c)(1) (2005).
65. Amber Resources I, 68 Fed. Cl. at 535.
66. See Century Expl., 110 Fed. Cl. at 155.
67. See Get to Know the Drilling Industry, MÆRSK DRILLING, http://www.maerskdrilling.com/
en/about-us/the-drilling-industry (last visited Feb. 16, 2019).
68. See id.
69. See Gas Exploration, NATGAS.INFO, http://www.natgas.info/gas-information/what-isnatural-gas/gas-exploration (last visited Feb. 15, 2019).
70. See id.
71. See Merlin Flower, Oil Drilling–an Expensive Business, OIL-PRICE.NET, http://www.oilprice.net/en/articles/oil-drilling-expensive-business.php (last visited Feb. 15, 2019).
72. See Sec’y of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312, 340 (1984).
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amount of recoverable resources in the prior stages. 73 After the plan is
approved, the operator can obtain drilling permits and drilling can begin. 74
There is a considerable amount of planning and work that goes into
developing a well, and the price of the lease can be substantial. 75 The
process takes years and must be supervised by several government
agencies. 76 In light of the process a lessee must undergo before seeing a
return on investment, the granting of an offshore lease cannot be an
arbitrary process. Once a private company obtains a lease, and has invested
capital, its investment should be protected.
II. THE EMERGING COMMON LAW OF OFFSHORE LEASE
BREACHES
Since offshore operations are governed by leases issued pursuant to the
OCSLA, principles of contract law apply. 77 As the Supreme Court
explained in Winstar, “when the United States enters into contract relations,
its rights and duties therein are governed generally by the law applicable to
contracts between private individuals.” 78 These leases contain a bargained
for promise: the government promised these companies that they could
explore for oil or gas and later recover the resources they find, provided that
they follow the four stages of development and any applicable statutes and
regulations to which they are subject per the lease agreement. 79
Over the past few decades, when the value of a contract has been
substantially impaired by a new act or regulation, lessees have pursued
damages arising from a breach of contract. 80 A breach of contract claim
requires “plaintiffs to demonstrate: (1) a valid contract between the parties;
(2) an obligation or duty arising from that contract; (3) a breach of that
duty; and (4) damages caused by the breach.” 81 When the government
attempts to subject the lessee to a new act or regulation, and in doing so
denies the lessee “certain elements of the permission-seeking opportunities

73. Amber Resources was a series of cases that stretched on for many years. The cases that
proved material for the development of common law in this sector are Amber Resources I and
Amber Resources II. See Amber Res. Co. v. United States (Amber Resources I), 68 Fed. Cl. 535,
545 (2005); Amber Res. Co. v. United States (Amber Resources III), 87 Fed. Cl. 16 (2009).
74. See Amber Resource I, 68 Fed. Cl. at 545.
75. See Top Ten Highest Bids on a Single Block for All Gulf Sales, BUREAU OF OCEAN
ENERGY MGMT., https://www.boem.gov/Top-Ten-Highest-Bids-on-a-Single-Block-for-All-GulfSales/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2019).
76. See Amber Resources I, 68 Fed. Cl. at 535.
77. See Mobil Oil Expl. and Producing S.E., Inc. v. U.S., 530 U.S. 604, 609 (2000).
78. U.S. v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 895 (1996).
79. See Mobil Oil, 530 U.S. at 609.
80. See generally Amber Resources I, 68 Fed. Cl. 535 (2005) (providing a history of litigation
arising from new acts and regulations).
81. San Carlos Irr. & Drainage Dist. v. United States, 877 F.2d 957, 959 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
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that the contracts had promised,” then a breach has occurred. In that case,
the contract should be repudiated. 82
Some general contract principles are important to remember when
determining whether to repudiate a contract. If a contract is to be
repudiated, the non-repudiating party is entitled “to restitution for any
benefit that he has conferred on [the repudiating party] by way of part
performance or reliance.” 83 The Second Restatement of Contracts defines
repudiation as a “statement by the obligor to the obligee indicating that the
obligor will commit a breach that would of itself give the obligee a claim
for damages for total breach.” 84 A “total breach” is one that “so
substantially impairs the value of the contract to the injured party at the
time of the breach that it is just in the circumstances to allow him to recover
damages based on all his remaining rights to performance.” 85
A. CASES PRIOR TO CENTURY EXPLORATION
In 1981, the Supreme Court addressed these issues in Mobil Oil. In
Mobil Oil, the Supreme Court repudiated a lease and granted restitution to
the plaintiff companies. 86 In that case, two oil companies paid $156 million
(plus annual payments) to the Government in exchange for 10-year
renewable lease contracts which provided them with rights to explore and
develop oil off of the OCS. 87 MMS had initially concluded that a draft
version of their EP would pass the OCSLA standard.88 In 1990, two days
before the companies’ final EP was submitted, the Outer Banks Protection
Act (OBPA) was enacted. 89 The OBPA prohibited the Secretary from
approving any EP until an Environmental Sciences Review Panel reported
that the Secretary had sufficient information to make approval decisions
under the OCSLA. 90 Additionally, the Secretary was directed to not
approve any Plan for thirteen months under any circumstances. 91 The
companies filed suit, alleging, inter alia, that “the Government repudiated
the contracts when it denied them certain elements of the permissionseeking opportunities that the contract had promised.” 92

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Mobil Oil, 530 U.S. at 604.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 373 (1981).
Id. at § 250.
Id. at § 243.
Mobil Oil, 530 U.S. at 605.
See id. at 609.
See Amber Res. Co. v. United States (Amber Resources I), 68 Fed. Cl. 535, 546 (2005).
The OBPA was enacted on August 18, 1990 and was later repealed in 1996. The
companies’ final EP was submitted two days after the enactment of the OBPA, a thirty-day
deadline to approve the plan would then have commenced. See Amber Resources I, 68 Fed. Cl. at
545.
90. See Mobil Oil, 530 U.S. at 604.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 607.
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Section 1 of the companies’ leases subjected the lessees to those
regulations issued pursuant to the OCSLA and incorporated “both those that
were ‘in existence upon the [leases’] effective date and those, promulgated
in the future.” 93 Under Section 1, the lease was subject to future regulations
if those regulations were issued pursuant to the OCSLA and “provide[d] for
the prevention of waste and conservation of the natural resources of the
[OCS].” 94 Other statutes and regulations were incorporated in a “catchall
provision.” 95 The Supreme Court reasoned that the catchall provision of
Section 1 had a temporal limitation and pertained only to statutes and
regulations existing at the time of the creation of the lease; otherwise “the
companies would have spent $158 million to buy next to nothing.” 96
Considering that new OBPA regulations restricted approval of any plan to a
period of at least thirteen months, the Court found this violated the lease
provisions which required EPs to be approved within thirty days. 97
Therefore, the leases were written in such a way as to assure exemption
from subsequent legislation such as the OPBA, and subjecting the leases to
the OBPA was a breach of contract. 98 The Court then repudiated the
contract and granted restitution for the $156 million the companies paid in
return for the right to explore and develop the OCS. 99
The U.S. Court of Federal Claims took a similar approach in Amber
Resources I. 100 In 1990, Congress amended section 307(c)(1) of the
CZMA. 101 This amendment and subsequent court decisions subjected the
grant of an OCS lease to its requirements and mandated that lessees would
have to comply with a federally mandated Coastal Management Program
(CMP). 102 The court followed the Mobil Oil reasoning and found that the
Section 1 “catchall provision” of the disputed lease also did not incorporate
future statutory changes enacted, which were not pursuant to the
OCSLA. 103 Furthermore, the court found that the “gateway” (the four-stage
process) was substantially narrowed by the modification of the lease
procedures, and, for those reasons, was a breach which constituted an

93. Amber Resources I, 68 Fed. Cl. at 546 (citing Mobil Oil, 530 U.S. at 615). Additionally,
the lease in Mobil Oil was subject to two provisions of the Department of Energy Organization
Act, however, this is not material for the purposes of this Note. See id. at 545.
94. Century Expl. New Orleans v. United States, 110 Fed. Cl. 148, 166 (2013).
95. Mobil Oil, 530 U.S. at 616.
96. Amber Resources I, 68 Fed. Cl. at 545.
97. See Mobil Oil, 530 U.S. at 620–21.
98. See id. at 624.
99. See id.
100. See Amber Resources I, 68 Fed. Cl. at 545.
101. See generally California v. Norton, 311 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2002) (providing an in-depth
discussion of this section of the CZMA).
102. A CMP allows states to develop its own program to regulate offshore drilling off its coast.
See Amber Resources I, 68 Fed. Cl. at 539.
103. Id. at 547.
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anticipatory repudiation of the plaintiff’s lease agreement. 104 The court in
Amber Resources I held that the plaintiffs were entitled to rescission and
restitution, resulting in a return of approximately $1.1 billion in up-front
bonus payments. 105
Plaintiffs then brought suit again in Amber Resources II seeking
“recovery of exploration and other costs [incurred] to develop the
leaseholds.” 106 This claim amounted to an additional $727 million in “sunk
costs.” 107 This case is important in the history of offshore lease breaches
because it provides a framework to determine remedies for a breach. The
plaintiffs did not bring their claim on an expectation theory of recovery,
“presumably because proof to a reasonable degree of certainty would be
difficult, given the speculative nature of the enterprise of drilling for oil and
gas.” 108 Plaintiffs also did not characterize their claim for sunk costs under a
reliance theory of damages possibly because this would have left “room for
the argument that the contract would not have been profitable, and hence,
monies plaintiffs invested would have been lost even in the absence of a
breach.” 109 Plaintiffs instead opted to argue that restitution was the proper
remedy to recover these sunk expenditures.
The court disagreed with this position. 110 The court first noted that
“restitution . . . is a protean concept.” 111 Restitution is the proper remedy
when the plaintiff “has in reliance on the promise of the defendant
conferred some value on the defendant.” 112 This can be thought of as the
prevention of unjust enrichment. 113 In contrast, a reliance interest is the
proper remedy when “the plaintiff has in reliance on the promise of the
defendant changed his position.” 114 While both of these remedies
incorporate the concept of reliance, restitution is more concerned with the
conference of a benefit onto the defendant. 115 The court held that while the
sunk expenditures were “foreseeable and incurred pursuant to the contract,
they did not benefit the government in the same way as up-front
payments.” 116 Therefore, sunk expenditures are not recoverable under a
restitution theory. 117

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Century Expl. New Orleans, LLC v. United States, 110 Fed. Cl. 148, 165 (2013).
See Amber Res. Co. v. United States (Amber Resources II), 73 Fed. Cl. 738, 740 (2006).
Id.
Id. at 741.
Id. at 740.
Id. at 745.
See id. at 758.
Id. at 742.
Id. at 744.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 744–46.
Id. at 746.
Id. at 758.
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The court left open the possibility of recovery of sunk expenditures, but
only if plaintiffs do so under a reliance theory. 118 To do so, the plaintiff
must “demonstrate a causal connection between the breach and a net loss of
the leases.” 119 This case set a precedent for remedies in the breach of
offshore leases. In the event of a breach, it is more than likely that the
plaintiff will be able to repudiate the contract and receive restitution
damages. 120 Should the plaintiff wish to recover sunk expenditures, the
plaintiff must do so under a reliance theory. 121 This is problematic because
it will be costly for the plaintiff to rebut the government’s defense that the
contract may not have been profitable; a plaintiff will need evidence as to
the profitability of a contract should they attempt to recover sunk
expenditures. 122
B. THE PRINCIPAL CASE: CENTURY EXPLORATION
Following the Deepwater Horizon disaster in 2010, the government
adopted a number of new requirements for drilling on the OCS. 123 The
Deepwater Horizon disaster was a massive oil spill along the Gulf of
Mexico. 124 In response to the disaster, the Secretary issued an order to cease
all deep-water drilling activities and prohibited new permits; 125 this order
stayed in effect until the closing of the Macondo well. 126 The DOI passed a
number of new substantive regulations such as the Drilling Safety Rule
(DSR) 127 and the Workplace Safety Rule (WSR). 128 Before the incident, in
2008, Century Exploration New Orleans, LLC (Century Exploration) had
leased land on the OCS in order to drill. 129 In response to the postDeepwater Horizon regulations, Century Exploration brought suit against
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

See id. at 757.
Id. at 742.
See id. at 744–46.
See id. at 758.
See id. at 745.
See Century Expl. New Orleans, LLC v. United States, 110 Fed. Cl. 148, 157 (2013).
Id.
See id. at 167.
In the Deepwater Horizon disaster, the drilling rig was named Deepwater Horizon. The
well that was being drilled was the Macondo well. See Macondo Prospect, Gulf of
Mexico, OFFSHORE TECH., https://www.offshore-technology.com/projects/macondoprospect/ (last
visited Dec 27, 2018).
127. The Drilling Safety Rule has the following purposes: to enhance the classification of wellcontrol barriers; to define testing requirements for cement; to clarify requirements for the
installation of dual mechanical barriers; and to extend requirements for BOPs and well-control
fluids to well-completions, workovers, and decommissioning operations. See Drilling Safety
Rule, BUREAU OF SAFETY & ENVTL. ENF’T (2012), https://www.bsee.gov/site-page/index-9 (last
visited Nov 21, 2018).
128. The WSR “require[d] each OCS operator to develop and implement a Safety and
Environmental Management System (SEMS) for its operations.” See Century Expl. 110 Fed. Cl. at
160.
129. See generally Century Expl. New Orleans, LLC v. United States, 110 Fed. Cl. 148 (2013)
(providing an in-depth discussion of as to how and where the land was leased).
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the U.S. government alleging breach of contract. Its claim was based on the
allegation that the new measures unexpectedly changed the rules governing
offshore activities and that this change rendered its contract commercially
impracticable. 130 In analyzing the Court’s ruling, this Note will consider the
holding in regard to: (1) new regulations; (2) notices to lessees; and (3) the
sovereign acts defense.
1. Regulations Enacted Post-Deepwater Horizon
The U.S. Court of Federal Claims in Century Exploration determined
that neither the new requirements of the DSR nor the WSR breached the
terms of the lease. 131 In so holding, the court reasoned that the decisions in
Amber Resources and in Mobil Oil were based on a “preliminary
determination that the leases at issue did not incorporate future statutory
changes. Those cases did not hold, however, that the government assumes
the risk of future regulations, at least not those issued under the
OCSLA.” 132 This interpretation suggests that lessees are subject to any
future regulation so long as that regulation is issued pursuant to the
OCSLA. 133 The plaintiffs argued that this interpretation would make their
contract illusory. 134 However, the court reasoned that the lease was not
illusory because the lease was only subject to future regulations issued
pursuant to the OCSLA, which assured the plaintiffs with “a stable statutory
regime under [their lease] 135 . . . [and that] they assumed the risk of future
regulatory changes within the context of that regime.” 136 For these reasons,
the Court held that none of the new regulations breached the lease.
This approach to the lessee’s contracts makes sense in that the lessees
are aware that they are subject to regulations enacted pursuant to the
OCSLA. In the court’s opinion, “Section 1 does not grant the government
unfettered authority to change the rules during the game instead, its
discretion is cabined by [the OCSLA].” 137 This regime still allows for
lessees to achieve a substantial degree of certainty by allocating to them
only those risks to which the lease is expressly subject (the OSCLA), while
the government assumes the risks of all other future regulation. 138 However,
this raises the issue of just how much the government can shift risks within
this framework before the courts will find the shift to be substantial enough
to warrant repudiation.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

See id. at 152.
See id. at 167.
Id. at 165.
See id. at 165–67.
See id. at 167.
Form BOEM-2005, supra note 43, at § 1.
Century Expl. New Orleans, LLC v. United States, 110 Fed. Cl. 148, 166 (2013).
Id. at 165.
See id.
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2. Questionable Legality of the Notice to Lessees
The most significant issue for the lessees was not the new regulations,
but an updated bonding requirement pursuant to Notice to Lessees No.
2010-N06 (NTL-06). 139 In NTL-06, the DOI notified Century that its
bonding requirement was quadrupling from $35 million to $150 million. 140
The modification to the bonding requirement was imposed by a
“notification, an email, and a FAQ document,” and so was not considered to
be a regulation. 141 The court held that the new demand for the bonding
requirement complied with the terms of the lease 142 because the DOI merely
changed the worst-case scenario of a potential spill, which in effect moved
the lessee into a higher category demanding a more expensive bond
requirement. 143 The effect of this change was that Century could not pay for
the updated bond requirement and lost the lease, along with a $23 million
down payment. 144
The section of the lease at issue was Section 8, which requires that the
lessee “shall at all times maintain the bond(s) required by regulation prior to
issuance of the lease.” 145 Surely, this provision does not require a lessee to
have the funds available for a higher bond requirement than was required at
the signing of their lease; otherwise, why not simply require a lessee to post
that higher bond? While the regulations regarding the bond requirement
needed for a worst-case discharge have not changed—NTL-06 in fact
moved the lessees into a higher category requiring this bond requirement—
this is a de facto change to Section 8. The court seemed to recognize this
flaw, concluding that even if “NTL-06 has in fact breached section 8 of the
lease, the government is nonetheless protected from such a breach under the
sovereign acts doctrine.” 146 The court’s ruling here is troubling because it
appears to ignore the holdings of Amber Resources and Century
Exploration. Even though the new bonding requirements were prohibitively
expensive for Century, the court ruled that these requirements did not
materially breach the underlying agreement.

139. The bonding requirement is essentially an amount of money set aside which may be used
for cleanup in the event of an oil or gas discharge into the ocean, such as what occurred in
Deepwater Horizon; the purpose of the bonding requirement is to ensure compliance with the
lessee’s obligations under the lease and applicable regulations. Century Expl., 110 Fed. Cl. at 159.
140. See Todd Gaziano & Mark Miller, The Need to Regulate What Constitutes A Federal
Regulation,
FORBES
(DEC.
12,
2014,
5:58
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/12/12/the-need-to-regulate-what-constitutes-a-federalregulation/#724df3512e5f.
141. See id.
142. See Form BOEM-2005, supra note 43, at § 8.
143. See Century Expl. New Orleans, LLC v. United States, 110 Fed. Cl. 148, 171 (2013).
144. See Gaziano & Miller, supra note 140.
145. The language in the current lease form may vary. See Form BOEM-2005, supra note 43, at
§ 8.
146. Century Expl. New Orleans, 110 Fed. Cl. at 172.
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3. Sovereign Acts Doctrine
Finally, the Century Exploration court found that even if the lease had
been breached, the sovereign acts defense would apply. This doctrine
applies because the actions were “sovereign in nature—i.e., they were
public and general—and rendered the government’s performance under
the lease not only impracticable, but legally impossible.” 147 The Federal
Circuit previously held that “the government-as-contractor cannot exercise
the power of its twin, the government-as-sovereign, for the purpose of
altering, modifying, obstructing[,] or violating the particular contracts
which it had entered with private parties. Such action would give the
government-as-contractor powers that private contracting parties lack.” 148
The sovereign acts doctrine balances the Government’s need to legislate
with its obligation to honor its contracts.149 It is the principle that “the
government is not liable for breach of contract whenever it takes any
generally applicable action in its sovereign capacity that incidentally
frustrates performance of a contract.” 150
It is important to consider the implications of the Deepwater Horizon
disaster in analyzing the court’s Century Exploration decision. In April of
2010, a drilling rig named Deepwater Horizon exploded. 151 The resulting oil
spill lasted several months and released 4.2 million barrels of oil into the
Gulf of Mexico. 152 Michael Harbut, a professor at Michigan State
University, claimed that, “exposure to organic solvents [solvents resulting
from the oil spill and cleanup efforts] causes the same intellectual effect as
lead poisoning.” 153 The individuals who were most heavily exposed will
“see chronic adverse health effects, including liver and kidney disease, birth
defects, and developmental disorders. Over time, we’ll see a bump in
certain cancers that are related to industrial solvents, such as leukemia,
lymphomas, and lung and skin cancers.” 154 The spill was said to be a “‘spill
of national significance’—the first time in history that term has been
used.” 155
It is unlikely that the sovereign acts doctrine will be a readily available
defense in future cases, unless there were circumstances as significant as the
Deepwater Horizon spill. This is because the case law provides that if the
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 177.
See Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. v. United States, 112 F.3d 1569, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
See id.
Century Expl. New Orleans, 110 Fed. Cl. at 177 (emphasis added).
See Campbell Robertson & Clifford Krauss, Gulf Spill Is the Largest of Its Kind, Scientists
Say, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/03/us/03spill.html.
152. Linda Marsa, 6 years after Deepwater Horizon oil spill, thousands of people are still sick,
GRIST (Oct 10, 2016), http://grist.org/article/6-years-after-deepwater-horizon-oil-spill-thousandsof-people-are-still-sick.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Century Expl. New Orleans, LLC v. United States, 110 Fed. Cl. 148, 157 (2013).
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purpose of the government’s action is to “reliev[e] the government-ascontractor of its duties [, then those actions] are not sovereign in nature.” 156
One explanation for the outcome is that the Century Exploration court was
shocked at the disaster and decided public policy would be best served in
allowing the government to exercise all its powers to prevent a spill of this
magnitude from occurring again.
4. Aftermath of Century Exploration
Following the result of Century Exploration, commenters have said that
“the Federal Circuit essentially allowed the government to rewrite the terms
of a government contract through incorporated regulatory provisions.” 157
This case raises a number of issues; while it seems that court correctly
applied the sovereign acts defense, the court’s other findings could prove
problematic. The interpretation that the contract is subject to any future acts
pursuant to the OCSLA makes the limits of the Government’s power to
impose new (perhaps substantively burdensome) regulations unclear, if not
unlimited. This decision relies on the technicality that the Government only
changed a factor in determining the bond requirement, which shifted the
lessee into a cost-prohibitive category, but did not impose a new list of
bond requirements. 158 To what extent the Government is allowed to shift
factors such as those regarding the bond requirements remains unclear, and
could result in substantial burdens for lessees. The following Section will
recommend a standard approach to the breach of a lease that will promote
consistency in the case law moving forward.
III.

A FRAMEWORK FOR RESOLVING OFFSHORE LEASE
BREACHES

Disputes that arise after the government enacts regulation constituting a
material breach of contract are difficult to resolve. The cases involve
mountains of facts and convoluted legal arguments, and litigation can drag
on for years. Courts should return to fundamental contract principles and
apply a test that accounts for the language of the lease and applies equity.
This approach is two-pronged and asks: (1) whether the government action
in question constitutes a breach of contract upon the terms of the agreement,
and (2) whether the action materially alters the agreement by “narrowing
the gateway” through which a lessee must pass to exercise the full
156. When “considering whether the alleged sovereign act is exclusively directed to aborting
performance of government contracts, courts addressing the sovereign acts doctrine have looked
to the extent to which the governmental action was directed to relieving the government of its
contractual obligations.” Id. at 178 (citing Conner Bros. Const. Co., Inc. v. Geren, 550 F.3d 1368,
1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
157. Kyle R. Jefcoat, The Federal Circuit’s 2014 Government Contract Decisions, 64 AM. U. L.
REV. 807, 853 (2015).
158. See Century Expl. New Orleans, 110 Fed. Cl. at 171.
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enjoyment of their rights. 159 If there is a breach, then repudiation of the
contract is the appropriate remedy, although a plaintiff may argue further
for reliance damages. 160 Unfortunately, there will be a substantial risk of
litigation for companies involved in offshore drilling especially in more
vulnerable areas (such as ANWR). 161
A. DETERMINING WHEN GOVERNMENT ACTION CONSTITUTES A
BREACH
The inquiry should first focus on whether the government directly
violated the terms of the lease. This is a standard inquiry into whether there
is a breach of contract. Essentially, if the Government “[broke] an important
contractual promise, thereby ‘substantially impair[ing] the value of the
contract[s]’ to the companies,” then there is a breach and remedies are
appropriate. 162 It is important under this prong of the framework to look to
the language of the lease itself. Unfortunately, there is still ambiguity in the
standard lease contracts. 163
The issue of the catchall provision in Century Exploration has been
exacerbated in the most current version of the standard lease available from
BOEM. 164 As one commenter described it, “the broad language in Section 1
of the current lease form is even more expansive in scope than the language
in the Century [Exploration] lease.” 165 Specifically, the new lease form has
a catchall provision which incorporates all future statutes and regulations,
not just those issued under OCSLA. 166 The courts of Mobil Oil and Amber
Resources opined that if the leases in those cases were subjected to “the
159. The full enjoyment first being an opportunity to try to obtain development rights in
accordance with the agreed upon framework. See Mobil Oil Expl. & Producing S.E., Inc. v.
United States, 530 U.S. 604, 620 (2000).
160. See Amber Res. Co. v. United States (Amber Resources II), 73 Fed. Cl. 738, 740 (2006).
161. Litigation risk is the risk that company may face lawsuits. See generally Jonathan T.
Molot, A Market in Litigation Risk, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 367 (2009).
162. Mobil Oil, 530 U.S. at 608.
163. See Form BOEM-2005, supra note 43, at § 1.
164. Id.
165. Dana E. Dupre, What Makes the United States Offshore Leasing System So Special? A
Primer on the Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Lease, 4 LSU J. ENERGY L. & RESOURCES 37,
41 (2015).
166. Section 1 of the most current standard lease contract states the following:
This lease is issued pursuant to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of August 7, 1953; 43
U.S.C. 1331 et seq., as amended, (hereinafter called “the Act”). This lease is subject to the Act,
regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, and other statutes and regulations in existence upon the
Effective Date of the lease, and those statutes enacted (including amendments to the Act or other
statutes) and regulations promulgated thereafter, except to the extent they explicitly conflict with
an express provision of this lease. It is expressly understood that amendments to existing statutes
and regulations, including but not limited to the Act, as well as the enactment of new statutes and
promulgation of new regulations, which do not explicitly conflict with an express provision of this
lease may be made and that the Lessee bears the risk that such may increase or decrease the
Lessee’s obligations under the lease. (emphasis added)
See BOEM-2005, supra note 43, at § 1.
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requirements of any statute or regulation created in the future, ‘the
companies would have spent [their money] to buy next to nothing.’” 167
This change also undermines the main argument of the Century
Exploration court for a broad interpretation of Section 1. Instead of Section
1 “creating a substantial degree of certainty for lessees” regarding allocation
of risk, Section 1 now widens the scope and content of regulations to which
the lessee is subject. 168 This shifts the allocation of risk entirely onto the
lessees and provides the government with a “route of complete escape”
from its contractual duties. 169 The government cannot walk away from its
contractual obligations; a “route of complete escape” is “incompatible with
the existence of a contract.” 170 According to Corbin on Contracts:
If what appears to be a promise is an illusion, there is no promise; like the
mirage of the desert with its vision of flowing water which yet lets the
traveler die of thirst, there is nothing there. By the phrase “illusory
promise” is meant words in promissory form that promise nothing; they do
not purport to put any limitation on the freedom of the alleged promisor,
but leave his future action subject to his own future will, just as it would
have been had he said no words at all. 171

The possibility of non-performance is unacceptable in a contract. 172
Additionally, under the updated version of Section 1, the “government’s
power to terminate for convenience, allowing unlimited exculpation, is too
broad.” 173 In making Section 1 broader, companies may now have a defense
that the lease itself was merely an illusory promise.
Alternatively, courts may interpret the requirements in the updated
version of Section 1 as less demanding than in prior cases. The risk of
regulatory change is an issue in government contracts. 174 When there is an
allegation of a breach of contract due to a regulatory change, the initial
burden is allocated to the Government because it is the Government that
would be unable to perform on its promise. 175 The allocation of risk does
not shift to the contractor when the language of the contract only requires
167. Amber Res. Co. v. United States (Amber Resources I), 68 Fed. Cl. 535, 545 (2005)
(quoting Mobil Oil, 530 U.S. at 616).
168. Century Expl. New Orleans, LLC v. United States, 110 Fed. Cl. 148, 165 (2013).
169. Id.
170. Torncello v. United States, 681 F.2d 756, 769 (Ct. Cl. 1982).
171. Id. at 769 (citing ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN & JOSEPH M PERILLO, 1 CORBIN
ON CONTRACTS § 145 (1962)).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See Cardiosom, L.L.C. v. United States, 117 Fed. Cl. 526, 532 (2014) (“Risk-shifting
language refers to contractual language that shifts the risk of regulatory change from the
government to the contractor. The risk of regulatory change refers to the risk that Congress might
pass a new statute, or an agency might promulgate a new regulation, that would prevent the
agency from meeting its obligations, as promised under an existing contract with a private
party.”); see also United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 881 (1996).
175. See Cardiosom, 117 Fed. Cl. at 532.
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the contracted parties to comply with applicable laws and regulations. 176 In
Winstar, the Supreme Court held that the Government breached its
contractual obligations, and in so holding rejected the Government’s
unmistakability defense. 177 Winstar “stands for the proposition that the
government is still obligated to honor its contracts even if the governing
regulations change.” 178
One way to solve the current uncertainty as to Section 1 is for BOEM to
re-include language from the prior version of Section 1leases, because it
allows for more certainty within the contract. 179 This prior version created a
substantial degree of certainty for lessees because it “allocate[ed] to the
government the risk of future statutory changes, while allocating to the
lessee the risk of future regulations issued pursuant to a single statute, to
which the lease [was] expressly subject.” 180 This approach allows for a fair
allocation of risk: it allows the government to regulate activity of the OCS
to prevent waste and conserve natural resources as is its statutory duty
under the OCSLA, 181 while companies would benefit from a stable statutory
regime. Accordingly, under this framework, future regulations that are not
issued pursuant to the OCSLA would breach the contract if the lessees were
forced to comply. This Note recommends that BOEM rewrite the language
of Section 1 to reflect the language used in the leases of Mobil Oil and
Amber Resources.
The second prong of the approach is an equitable test to determine
whether a breach has occurred. Courts have continued to affirm the
reasoning in Mobil Oil that “under the contracts, the incorporated
procedures and standards amounted to a gateway to the companies’
enjoyment of all other rights” and so the test should be whether “[the
regulation] significantly narrowed that gateway and therefore materially
breached the plaintiffs’ leases.” 182 As discussed previously, the gateway is
the comprehensive four-stages process of the development of an offshore
oil or gas well. Considering that DPP approval requires a massive amount
of work, it is clear that the gateway should be an important part of a court’s
analysis.
In determining whether the narrowing is substantial, a helpful inquiry is
whether the government’s action goes “to the root” or “essence” of
the agreement between the parties, 183 or is “one which touches the
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Admiral Fin. Corp. v. United States, 378 F.3d 1336, 1342–43 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing

Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. at 869–70).
179. The re-included language would provide that the lease is only subject to future regulations
issued pursuant to the OCSLA, as opposed to being subject to all future regulations.
180. Century Expl. New Orleans, LLC v. United States, 110 Fed. Cl. 148, 165 (2013).
181. See 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (2012).
182. Century Expl. New Orleans, 110 Fed. Cl. at 165.
183. Frank Felix Assocs., Ltd. v. Austin Drugs, Inc., 111 F.3d 284, 288–89 (2d Cir. 1997).
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fundamental purpose of the contract and defeats the object of the parties in
entering into the contract.” 184 Under the Restatement, an important inquiry
to determine “whether a failure is material is the extent to which the injured
party will be deprived of the benefit which he reasonably expected from the
exchange.” 185 For example, if BOEM implemented a regulation with the
clear goal of prohibitively burdening the lessees, this would defeat the
object of the agreement and should be considered a material breach of
contract. A regulation which imposes too much of a burden on the lessee
should be invalidated by the court.
Under this second prong, courts should not treat the decision of the
Century Exploration court that the new bonding requirements did not
constitute a breach of contract as precedential. Under the very language of
the Restatement, the new bonding requirement would be a material failure
because Century Exploration was “deprived of [a] benefit . . . reasonably
expected from the exchange.” 186 Instead, courts should use Century
Exploration as precedent only in the event of another disaster warranting
the application of the sovereign acts doctrine.
B. WHAT REMEDIES ARE AVAILABLE?
Determining the adequate remedy for the aggrieved party will be one of
the most contentious issues in these cases. Repudiation should be awarded
in the event of a breach by the government which “substantially impairs the
value of the contract.” 187 As stated in Mobil Oil, after the plaintiff proves
that a breach of contract occurred, “the Government must give the
companies their money back” unless the companies waived their rights to
restitution. 188 An injured party may also argue for reliance damages,
although these damages are subject to the defense that the contract would
have been unprofitable.189 Because of the volatility of energy industry
prices, it is highly unlikely that a court will award expectation damages
because they are too speculative. 190 After Amber Resources II, companies
that want to recover sunk expenditures (such as survey costs, exploratory
drilling, etc.), must advance their claim under a reliance theory. 191
The role of the reliance interest in damages is very clearly articulated
by Lon Fuller and William R. Perdue:
The plaintiff has in reliance on the promise of the defendant changed his
position. For example, the buyer under a contract for the sale of land has
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Ervin Const. Co. v. Van Orden, 874 P.2d 506, 510 (Idaho 1993).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 241 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
Id.
Id. § 243.
Mobil Oil Expl. & Producing S.E., Inc. v. United States, 530 U.S. 604, 608 (2000).
See Amber Res. Co. v. United States (Amber Resources II), 73 Fed. Cl. 738, 745 (2006).
See id. at 740.
See id. at 746.
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incurred expense at the investigation of the seller’s title, or has neglected
the opportunity to enter other contracts. We may award damages to the
plaintiff for the purpose of undoing the harm which his reliance on the
defendant’s promise has caused him. Our object is to put him in as good a
position as he was in before the promise was made. The interest protected
in this case may be called the reliance interest. 192

As it applies to offshore leases, the principle is simple: if the
government breaches the lease, then the government should provide the
lessee with the amount of money which they spent in reliance on the
contract. However, while the “assumption is that the injured party would at
least have recovered his expenses . . . that assumption may be rebutted.” 193
The government will have a defense that the damages should be capped at
the point where there was no longer a return on investment. 194 The burden
of proof will fall upon the government (as it is the breaching party) to prove
non-profitability. 195 The litigation over reliance damages is likely to be
highly contentious as it will concern millions, if not billions of dollars. 196
Recovery of reliance damages will carry high litigation costs.197 This is
something which companies should be prepared for in the event they sue
for repudiation of the contracts. This is an unfortunate aspect of operating in
a high-risk field. Keeping awareness of these costs in mind, companies
should avoid high-risk ventures (such as drilling in ANWR) unless they are
fully prepared for the consequences of the venture. A new administration
may pass regulations which breach a contract, and while the Government
will have to pay repudiation, any claim advanced under a reliance theory
will be subject to a costly rebuttal from the Government. Companies can
reduce this risk by only investing in leases which show a high likelihood of
earning potential and—should a lawsuit come about—by looking for
opportunities to exit the lawsuit quickly in the form of a settlement. 198 One
only needs to look at the near decade of litigation resulting from the Amber
Resources line of cases to see that drawn out litigation is a lose-lose for the
company’s shareholders and for America’s taxpayers.

192. Lon Fuller & William R. Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE
L.J. 52, 54 (1936).
193. Amber Resources II, 73 Fed. Cl. at 746.
194. See id. at 747.
195. See Kizas v. Webster, 532 F. Supp. 1331, 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
196. See generally Amber Resources II, 73 Fed. Cl. 738 (2006) (discussing the Amber
Resources cases that concerned decades of litigation over millions of dollars).
197. See generally Jonathan T. Molot, A Market in Litigation Risk, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 367
(2009) (discussing the high cost of drawn out and complex litigation).
198. William Dickerman, Five Ways to Effectively Reduce the Cost of Litigation, DICKERMAN
& ASSOCIATES, http://www.dickermanlaw.com/en/legal-articles/22-5-ways-to-effectively-reducethe-cost-of-litigation (last visited Dec. 25, 2017).
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CONCLUSION
The future of offshore drilling is protean and uncertain. One only needs
to look at the substantial changes which have occurred in the month of
January 2019 as evidence. During that month, the Democratic Party
regained control of the House of Representatives. 199 Almost immediately,
on January 8, 2019, a group of House Democrats introduced bills which
would substantially impede offshore drilling. 200 The bills would ban
outright or place a ten-year moratorium on “offshore drilling in the Atlantic,
Pacific[,] and Arctic oceans, as well as the eastern Gulf of Mexico.”201 This
would reverse or substantially disrupt any lease sales which the Trump
administration has introduced since the announcement of his “America
First” policy. These dramatic changes highlight the need for stability within
the industry. As regulations change and administrations shift, the
government is still subject to the contracts which it has entered into in the
past and it is bound as a private contractor.
The test articulated in this Note provides a clear approach to solve these
expensive and complex disputes. Once again, the test is: (1) whether the
government action in question constitutes a breach of contract upon the
terms of the agreement, and (2) whether the action materially alters the
agreement by “narrowing the gateway” through which a lessee must pass to
exercise the full enjoyment of their rights. Applying this test will enable
courts to more efficiently resolve disputes arising from the actions of
shifting administrations and evolving national interests. This is crucial in
the highly politicized environment which oil and gas companies operate,
and in utilizing this framework contract law can be a stabilizing force in a
sea of uncertainty.
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